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Abstract: Autonomy, Manipulation, and Respect (for Mortals) 
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ABSTRACT: Manipulative communication (communication that “pushes people’s buttons,” works at an 
unconscious level, and bypasses critical thinking) is often regarded as unethical because it fails to respect rational 
autonomy. But, if we take seriously the extent to which people are only very imperfectly rational, we may need to 
rethink this norm and the associated conception of autonomy. 
KEYWORDS: autonomy, manipulation, respect, science communication 
1. EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
Many, perhaps most, perhaps nearly all people thinking seriously about the ethics of science 
communication have adopted a very high-minded set of norms. To pick just one example, Dan 
Kahan (2012) of the Cultural Cognition Project at Yale has posted “Ethical Guidelines for 
Science Communication Informed by Cultural Cognition Research.” They are: 
(1) No Lying 
(2) No Manipulation 
(3) Use communication strategies and procedures only to promote engagement with 
information—not to induce conclusions. 
(4) Use strategies and procedures to promote engagement only when you have good reason 
to believe that engagement fits the aims and interests of information recipients. (That is, 
if people want to believe “unscientific” things because it helps them feel connected to 
their communities or the like, leave them alone.) (Kahan, 2012) 
I want to complicate this discussion by thinking more carefully about manipulation.  
 We want a definition of manipulation that does not build in moral condemnation. I 
suggest: Manipulation = actions intended to produce (cognitive, behavioral, emotional) effects 
by triggering non-rational emotional/cognitive reactions. 
 Drawing on Buss (2005), I argue that: 
• Manipulation doesn’t necessarily compromise autonomy. It doesn’t remove our ability 
to be self-governing. Even when manipulated we are still deciding for ourselves as 
much as we ever are. Choice and decision always operate on a set of beliefs and 
attitudes influenced by non-rational factors. The fact that some of those factors may be 
chosen by others who are trying to influence our beliefs or behavior does not 
fundamentally change the situation. 
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• Manipulation is not always wrong. Sometimes we can rationally endorse our own 
manipulation, at least after the fact. When my friends arrange a surprise party and get 
me to show up without disclosing the reason, I have been manipulated, but not 
wronged. If my wife cooks up chores for me to do, not because she wants them done 
but because she wants to get me to exercise without triggering my resistance to that 
endeavor, I have been manipulated, but not wronged. Buss argues that many personal 
relationships begin with seduction, as people show themselves to each other in their 
best light, etc., and are none the worse for that fact. 
• When manipulation is wrong it is because it prevents accurate understanding, precludes 
relationships based on equality, and/or because it undermines welfare. These faults are 
not always present, and, when they are, they come in degrees and need to be balanced 
against other values.  
• Given the extremely limited rationality of actual human beings, science communicators 
(like teachers, friends, lovers, and people in a variety of other roles) may need to be 
somewhat manipulative to be successful. For one thing, an emotional response to 
danger/surprise/novelty is what triggers rational deliberation. Most of the time we are 
operating on habitual, “auto-pilot” thinking. (This is explicitly argued by Marcus, 
Neuman, and Mackuen (2000) and seems to me to be implicit in Kahneman (2011).) 
Even when we want to engage people as rational deliberators, the first requirement of 
successful communication is to get their attention and set them to thinking. (In 
Kahneman’s terms this is the move from the “fast” System One to the “slow” System 
Two.) Moreover, given people’s cultural loyalties, our highly “polluted” information 
environment, and the urgency of some science-related problems, it may be necessary to 
“short-circuit” some degree of ideally deliberative processes to get timely action. Given 
the degree to which people are already not rationally deliberating, this may be a 
reasonable trade-off of accuracy (of belief) and equality (of relationships) for well-
being. 
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